



Economic Legacy Effects of Armed Conflict:  
Insights from the Civil War in Aceh, Indonesia 
 
Abstract:  
The province of Aceh in Indonesia provides a promising case for studying the 
economic legacy effects of conflict given sub-national district-level data on violence 
and gross domestic product. We demonstrate specific negative economic legacy 
effects of armed conflict despite a general peace dividend: whilst all districts in Aceh 
grow faster after conflict ends in 2005 than during the conflict, the districts that suffered 
relatively more from violence during the war grow relatively more slowly during 
peacetime than districts that experienced relatively little violence. These negative 
legacy effects are relatively short-lived, however, and are no longer statistically 
significant from 2009 onwards. 





Many studies examine the nexus between economic growth and armed civil conflict. 
Some investigate whether development failures, economic shocks and economic 
depressions increase the likelihood of conflicts (e.g. Bazzi and Blattman, 2014; Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2004; Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Sharma 2006; Gomes 
2015). Others analyse the economic damage caused by civil war (see e.g. Collier 
1999; Arunatilake et al. 2001; Costalli et al., 2017). Unsurprisingly, by and large, the 
literature agrees that bad economic performance makes civil wars more likely and also 
that civil war reduces growth (Collier and Hoeffler, 2007) though recent interventions 
stress the heterogeneous impact of civil war with large differences across countries 
(Bove et al., 2017; Minhas and Radford, 2017). But what happens once war is over?  
We know much less about the economic legacy effects of civil wars. Empirical studies 
at the national or cross-national level have great difficulty accounting for the 
endogeneity of civil war and civil war endings and, more importantly, by definition 
cannot account for heterogeneous economic legacy effects across sub-national units. 
Only few studies analyse differences in post-civil war performance at the sub-national 
level. Miguel and Roland (2011) find that Vietnamese districts and provinces that were 
more heavily bombed by the United States during 1965 to 1975 than others 
experienced no statistically significant differences in terms of poverty rates, 
consumption levels and population density in 1999 to 2002. Of course, Vietnam was 
a fully internationalized civil war, United States bombing is just one aspect of the 
violence experienced during this conflict and 25 years is probably too long a time 
period to find negative economic legacy effects, which limits the direct comparability 
of this study to two other studies that are closer to our own analysis. Collier and 




operating in what were previously conflict zones lag behind firms operating in other 
areas five years after the end of Sierra Leone’s conflict in 2002. Finally, Serneels and 
Verpoorten (2015) examine consumption levels of households and aggregated to 
sectors in Rwanda. Their estimates suggest that rural households and communities, 
which experienced more violence during the genocide in 1994 and the ensuing civil 
war, have lower consumption levels six years after the end of violence than 
households and communities that experienced less violence.  
Aceh provides a good case study since in addition to high quality geocoded data 
covering conflict intensity in the form of recorded deaths as well as injuries, 
kidnappings, and rapes attributed to the separatist armed conflict, our study also 
benefits from the existence of a database on sub-national Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). This allows us to directly analyse economic growth performance at the sub-
national level. We can therefore examine whether sub-national units which experience 
more violence grow faster or slower after the end of the civil war than those units which 
experience less violence.  
Employing differences-in-differences as our causal inference technique, we 
demonstrate that during the years of conflict there are no statistically significant growth 
differences across districts within Aceh as a function of how much violence they 
experienced during the civil war. The most likely reason for this are negative economic 
spill-over effects from more violent to less violent units, well documented in the 
literature albeit in different contexts (e.g., Murdoch and Sandler 2004), essentially 
depressing economic activity everywhere during conflict. This general growth-
depressing effect makes sense given the small size of Aceh, which is less than three 




Virginia. Essentially, Aceh is too small that some parts of the peninsula could have 
escaped the detrimental effects of the violence on the economy during the conflict.  
This absence of statistically significant growth differences during the conflict allows us 
to make the identifying parallel historic paths assumption that districts which 
experienced less violence during the conflict can function as credible counter-factual 
units for those districts that experienced relatively more violence such that the 
economic legacy effects after the end of conflict can be estimated via differences-in-
differences. We find that those districts within Aceh that experienced more violence 
during the civil war grow relatively more slowly after the end of the conflict than districts 
that experienced relatively less war-time violence. This relative growth disadvantage 
exists despite the fact that all districts benefit from a peace dividend in that all districts 
grew faster after the end of the civil war than they did during the civil war. We thus find 
the co-existence of a general positive peace dividend (all districts grow faster after the 
end of civil war than they did during the civil war) together with specific negative legacy 
effects (districts that experienced more violence during the conflict grow relatively 
more slowly after the end of the civil war than districts that experienced less violence 
during the conflict). However, the negative legacy effects are relatively short-lived in 
that, at the latest, from 2009 onwards, i.e. 4 years after the end of conflict, districts that 
experienced more violence no longer grow statistically significantly more slowly than 
districts that were less exposed to violence during the armed conflict. 
In section 2, we review the existing literature on the economic legacy effects of armed 
conflict. Section 3 explains how the separatist conflict in Aceh came to an end and 
why some observers would regard the end of conflict as plausibly exogenous, though 
this is contested. The research design and the empirical strategy of employing 




on the end of conflict representing an exogenous quasi-natural experiment setting, are 
described in section 4, whereas results are presented in section 5. Section 6 explores 
the robustness of these findings and discusses potential threats to the inferential 
validity of the results. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Economic legacy effects of civil war 
Standard macro-economic theory suggests that economic recovery will kick in once 
peace has been reached. The neoclassical growth model predicts a return to the 
steady state level of the capital stock with the end of the fighting (Blattman and Miguel, 
2010). Large rates of return to investment are expected after the end of conflict as the 
physical capital stock returns to its equilibrium level, boosting economic growth. The 
prediction from the neoclassical growth model is thus convergence to the steady-state, 
which implies higher catch-up growth rates than the counterfactual after violence stops 
(Justino, 2011a), until the pre-war equilibrium is reached again. Endogenous growth 
models, which place more emphasis on human capital, typically predict more lasting 
damage to economic performance and a longer delay to the return to steady state as 
human capital loss is more difficult to replenish than reconstructing physical capital 
loss (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003). More pessimistically still, poverty trap models, as 
advanced by Sachs (2005) for example, suggest that prolonged and intense violent 
conflict can trap countries in a poor economic state until long after conflict has ceased. 
The empirical macroeconomic literature looking at country level aggregate economic 
output data after the end of civil wars provides mixed evidence. Kang and Meernik 
(2005) examine post-civil war growth performance in a global sample over the period 




negative economic growth rates in every year in the six-year period after the end of 
conflict. In our view, these estimates are much too high to carry credibility. Chen, 
Loayza & Reynal-Querol (2008) find that the average post-conflict per capita growth 
rate accelerates by about 2.4 percentage points after the conflict, compared to before 
the conflict, mostly owing to increased investment rates. The authors use an event-
study methodology in a cross-section of countries and conclude that post-conflict 
economies eventually converge to the counterfactual of countries not affected by 
conflict. A similar acceleration in post-conflict growth rates, one of 2 percentage points, 
albeit comparing post-conflict with conflict growth rates within countries, was also 
found by Elbadawi, Kaltani, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008), but only for the first two years 
after the conflict ended. Growth rates decelerated markedly after these two years, thus 
likely not indicative of convergence.  An influential study by Cerra and Saxena (2008) 
finds that output rebounded relatively quickly in the years after civil wars had started. 
However, Mueller (2012) recoded the dataset of Cerra and Saxena (2008), after 
discovering a coding error, and re-estimated the original empirical model. He came to 
the opposite conclusion, which is that the average civil war start depresses the 
economy and there is no recovery to the counterfactual trend. As noted by Mueller 
(2012), the methodology employed by Cerra and Saxena (2008) also fails to 
distinguish between civil wars that end shortly after they began and civil wars of longer 
duration such that the estimates based on this methodology mix up economic 
performance during and after civil wars. Lastly, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) find that it 
takes on average fourteen years for post-conflict countries to get back to their 
counterfactual GDP trajectory.  
Existing empirical macroeconomic evidence at the national or cross-national level is 




out, selection bias and problems with data measurement hamper reliable estimates. 
Yet, the main problem with national or cross-national level studies is that they do not 
allow one to analyse heterogeneous economic legacy effects that differ across sub-
national units as a function of the extent to which they were exposed to conflict 
violence, which requires a sub-national analysis. For example, it may well be that even 
though the national economy grows significantly faster in peace times than in war 
times this may be due to the better economic performance of areas that were affected 
relatively little by the brunt of the violence. It could still be that areas, which suffered 
heavily from the war, experience negative legacy effects, growing relatively more 
slowly during peace times than regions that were relatively little affected even though 
their growth performance during peace time may well be higher than their own growth 
performance during the conflict. Our sub-national data on economic growth and 
violence in Aceh allows us to test for heterogeneous economic legacy effects as a 
function of conflict intensity directly and credibly.  
Micro-economic studies provide many reasons why the peace time economic 
performance of areas that were heavily affected by violence during the prior conflict 
may be negatively impacted relative to areas that were much less affected by violence. 
There is mounting evidence suggesting lasting negative economic legacy effects from 
the impact of violent conflict on human health and human capital that linger on even 
when war is over. Devakumar et al. (2014) provide a theoretical framework linking 
health outcomes to conflict distinguishing between several different channels through 
which conflicts negatively affect health outcomes. Exposure to violent attacks leads 
not only to physical health damages, but also to mental and emotional traumas (see 
e.g. Murthy and Lakshiminarayana 2006; Yehuda and Bierer, 2008; Bratti et al., 2016) 




generation that had not yet been born during the times of the conflict (see Devakumar 
et al, 2014). Psychological traumas severely affect living conditions and economic 
activity and may substantially impair economic life in the long run. In a systematic 
literature review on the impact of violent conflict in the Middle East on the mental health 
of children and adolescents, Dimitry (2012) finds that conflict-related traumatic 
experiences correlate with the prevalence of mental health issues and behavioural 
problems of individuals. 
Conflict effects on health in early childhood are particularly dangerous as they are hard 
to make up over the course of the rest of the life (Verwimp, Bundervoet & Akresh, 
2010) and early childhood development is a good predictor for later levels of human 
development reached in the form of, for example, income, education and health (see 
Almond, 2006; Maccini and Yang, 2009). Akbulut-Yuksel (2017) finds that individual 
exposure during both prenatal (i.e., in utero) and early postnatal periods to intense 
destruction during World War II in Germany correlate with higher body mass index, a 
higher incidence of adult obesity and higher incidence of chronic health problems later 
on. Mansour and Rees (2012) report a modest increase in the probability of giving 
birth to a baby with lower birth weight if the mother was exposed to greater conflict 
intensity in the al-Aqsa Intifada. Akresh et al. (2012a) find that children and 
adolescents exposed to the Nigerian Civil War are stunted in their growth. 
Interestingly, whilst much of the literature emphasises the importance of violence on 
early childhood, these authors actually find the stature reducing effect to be stronger 
for adolescent exposure than for early childhood exposure. Akresh et al. (2017) 
expand this analysis and similarly find that the long-term negative consequences on 
women exposed to war in terms of likelihood of being stunted, being overweight and 




rather than early childhood. The children of these women are also more likely to die in 
early childhood, are more likely to be stunted if surviving and possibly achieve less 
education. 
Educational enrolment and attainment is typically lower in regions heavily affected by 
conflict even after the conflict stops (Justino, Leone, and Salardi 2013). For example, 
malnutrition during preschool times had adverse effects on human capital formation 
(grades completed) in Zimbabwe (Alderman et al., 2006). Chamarbagwala and Morán 
(2011) find that rural Mayans in departments where more acts of violence were 
committed achieved significantly fewer years of schooling than their counterparts in 
more peaceful departments. Akresh et al (2012b) find that Ethiopian-Eritrean children 
exposed to violence during the civil war are substantially shorter than those that were 
not (by about 0.42 standard deviations).  Justino, Leone, and Salardi (2013) followed 
Eastern Timorese cohorts of students that started primary school during the final years 
of the civil war and during a particularly intense wave of violence in 1999, relating their 
achievements over the short- and the long-term to pupils that were not affected by the 
violence. They find not only short-term effects of lower school completion for the pupils 
exposed to the peak of the violence, but also subsequently lower school completion 
rates. The short-term legacy effects of violence were significant for both sexes, 
whereas the long-term consequences only applied to boys. Bertoni et al. (2018) find 
that the violent conflict with the Boko Haram terror group in North-East Nigeria reduces 
school enrolment and years of education completed, with no differences found in terms 
of gender, religion or type of residential location. 
Related to human capital, Collier and Duponchel (2012) suggest “forgetting by not 
doing” (a kind of reverse of “learning by doing”) as the principal causal mechanism 




behind firms operating in other areas five years after the end of Sierra Leone’s conflict 
in 2002. Another potential mechanism via which prior conflict can negatively impact 
on growth performance during peace times is the negative impact of conflict on social 
capital. Kijewski and Freitag (2018) find that individuals who had war-related 
experiences during the Kosovo war were less likely to form social trust during peace 
time and the same is true for higher contextual war exposure independently of whether 
the individuals themselves have war-related experiences.  
Not all empirical evidence points in the direction of negative legacy effects of violent 
conflict, however. Valente (2014) finds that a larger number of abductions by Maoist 
groups in the civil conflict in Nepal, which are often targeted at schoolchildren, 
negatively impact female educational attainment, in line with most of the findings 
reported above. However, somewhat counterintuitively, she also finds elevated female 
educational attainment in places that experienced greater conflict casualties and 
attributes this to the progressive ideology of the insurgents with respect to gender 
equality and its policing of teacher absenteeism. Also for Nepal, Gilligan et al. (2014) 
find that communities experiencing greater violence exhibit, albeit in a laboratory-in-
the-field setting, greater levels of social capital in the form of altruistic giving, 
contributions to collective goods, investments in trust-based transactions and 
willingness to reciprocate trust-based investments.  
Existing studies thus provide conflicting evidence on the economic legacy effects of 
armed conflict. Much, though not all, of the macro-economic literature suggests a 
positive peace dividend whilst many, though again not all, micro-economic studies 
suggest negative economic legacy effects. We therefore test two competing 




H1. Districts in Aceh that experienced relatively more violence during the 
conflict grow relatively faster during peace times than districts that 
experienced relatively less violence during the conflict. 
versus 
H2. Districts in Aceh that experienced relatively more violence during the 
conflict grow relatively slower during peace times than districts that 
experienced relatively less violence during the conflict. 
 
3. The separatist conflict in Aceh and its end in the wake of the 2004 tsunami 
Aceh has historically been different from the rest of Indonesia in terms of culture and 
religion. A more conservative form of Islam is and has been prevalent in this region at 
the westernmost tip of the Sumatra Island (see map 1). The tensions between 
Acehnese independence ambitions and Jakarta’s centralist agenda as well as several 
political, cultural, and religious undercurrents, and crucially also disagreements with 
the central government on how to share the rents from resources extracted in Aceh, 
led to the formation of the Free Aceh Movement, or GAM (short for Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka), and the declaration of independence in 1976.  
Energy wealth, in particular riches related to oil and gas, may increase the risk of civil 
war (De Soysa and Neumayer, 2007), particularly in combination with ethnic 
fractionalization (Wegenast and Basedau 2014). Besides oil and gas, Ross (2005) 
identified five additional reasons why the civil war continued for nearly 30 years: (1) 
Indonesia’s democratic institutions, put in place after the demise of Suharto, the 
country’s long-term autocratic leader, were too fledgling and weak to channel 
Acehnese dissent through nonviolent means; (2) GAM benefited from the 




population felt aggrieved by the central government’s refusal to grant independence; 
(4) the symbolic and exemplary effect that the East Timor referendum had, which 
resulted in independence of this former part of Indonesia; (5) the lack of a credible and 
viable offer of the central government for an autonomous Aceh solution short of 
independence. Other reasons included opposition to inward migration from other 
islands, most notably Java and other parts of Sumatra, which many Acehnese 
perceived as a threat to the cultural and religious way of life in Aceh. 
An estimated 30,000 people were killed, and close to 350,000 people were injured 
during the almost 30 years of the conflict (MSR 2009). Yet, depending on one’s 
interpretation of events, the 2004 Boxing Day Indian Ocean tsunami either brought a 
swift end to the civil conflict between the GAM rebels and the Indonesian Army (TNI – 
short for Tentara Nasional Indonesia) (see e.g. Aspinall, 2005) or at the very least 
further facilitated a peace process that was already well under way and would have 
likely also occurred in the absence of the tsunami (see e.g. Waizenegger, 2007). In 
the former perspective, the end of conflict could be regarded as plausibly exogenous 
and representing a quasi-natural experiment setting, whereas in the latter perspective 
this would be a stretch too far. As we will explain in the next section, our inferential 
technique of differences-in-differences does not depend on the cessation of conflict 
























The floods made way for a massive humanitarian response and the start of 
cooperation between the central government and the rebels as they sought a unified 
response to the disaster. Jakarta first responded by lifting military emergency law, 
which paved the way for reconstruction to take place. The moderate, pragmatic and 
cooperative course of action of the Indonesian president Yudhoyono towards GAM in 
the aftermath of the tsunami led him to take the GAM concerns seriously, enabling a 
peace deal (Enia, 2008). Reacting towards a moderate stance of the president, the 
rebel group signalled an unequivocal readiness to negotiate a peace agreement (Enia, 
2008). The skilled peace negotiators, led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, 
and the significant attention brought on by the international community also facilitated 
peace as did the presence of humanitarian relief operations in the region.       
The peace deal, or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) as it was called, included 
disarmament of the rebels and withdrawal of government troops from Acehnese 
territory (with the exception of 25,000 soldiers that remained) and the formation of a 
regional political party (Donnan and Bergstrom, 2005) in exchange for autonomy or 
self-governance (an important compromising step shy of independence), which 
DeRouen et al. (2009) suggest is conducive to lasting peace. Moreover, it was agreed 
that the Acehnese population should receive 70 percent of the resource revenues 
exploited in the region, which were however dwindling due to resources stocks running 
out, as well as a much enhanced proportion of the General Allocation Fund (Dana 
Alokasi Umum), a block grant from the central government to Indonesian regions. On 
August 15, 2005 a peace accord was signed in Helsinki. For a detailed account of the 






The lingering detrimental impacts of the civil war on the health and well-being of 
Acehnese people were significant beyond what the 30,000 fatalities and close to 
350,000 injuries during the course of conflict would suggest. Surveying the fourteen 
most affected districts from the violence in Aceh revealed staggeringly high numbers 
of physical and psychological effects indicating severe traumas (IOM, 2007). In a 
household survey with a total sample size of 1,972 interviewed households, 74 percent 
of the respondents report having had a combat experience, 35 percent report having 
fled from a burning building, 46 percent having been forced to flee danger, 28 percent 
report having been beaten to the body, 26 percent report having been beaten on the 
head, 13 percent report having been strangled, 17 percent report having been 
attacked by a knife or gun, 43 percent report having a family member or friend killed, 
5 percent of women reported that their husbands were killed, 45 percent report having 
a family member or friend kidnapped or disappear, and 31 percent report having been 
extorted or robbed. Psychological symptoms amongst the Acehnese population were 
extraordinarily high amongst the sample surveyed in 2006 (IOM, 2006): 65 percent 
showed depression symptoms, 34 percent showed symptoms of post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). Out of these symptomatic psychological attests, 18 percent were 
diagnosed with severe depression and 10 percent had severe PTSD.  
Not only was the health of individuals negatively affected by acts of war, and after the 
war by lingering injuries, but so was access to health in post-war times. In several high 
conflict districts, particularly in Bireuen and Aceh Utara, only about one-third of the 
interviewed households signalled a readiness of receiving healthcare delivered by 
public health clinics (as they are operated by the central government, which the 






destruction was also significant in Aceh. Upon returning to their houses, many 
temporarily displaced households found their livestock, rice fields, gardens, 
plantations and tools burnt or pillaged (IOM, 2006). In fact, “we had to start from zero” 
was a phrase violence-affected households frequently replied when asked in the 
household interviews.  Overall 43 percent responded that their property was destroyed 
or confiscated (IOM, 2007).  Reintegration of ex-combatants, known to be a very 
significant problem from other country settings (see, e.g., Subedi 2014), posed a 
severe challenge, including insufficient reintegration allowances (so called Jadup) that 
were supposed to help the former rebels integrate into the labour market, with the 
focus on starting business (Schulze, 2007). There were several allegations of unequal 
distributions and corruption of these funds. 
 
4. Research design and empirical strategy  
We assembled a unique district-level dataset by merging local level GDP measures 
with local level violence measures. The violence data stem from the National Violence 
Monitoring System (NVMS), which is an innovative data tool that allows keeping track 
of acts of violence in Indonesia from 1999 onwards.1 The World Bank in conjunction 
with the Indonesian Ministry of People’s Welfare piloted it in 2011 with the aim to 
publicly document past acts of violence as well as keeping track of current ones in a 
mission to better manage and prevent violence. The online data portal contains data 
 
 
1 The data can be accessed at: http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2626 (last accessed: 






on where, when, and why violence took place and with which intensity. It contains in 
total about 180,000 incidents of violence for the entire country and is using national 
and local newspaper accounts, which are recording incidents since 1999. A detailed 
elaboration on the construction of the dataset as well as its advantages relative to 
other prevailing violence datasets in Indonesia can be found in Barron, Jaffrey and 
Varshney (2014). In particular, there are two often-used competing sources of data on 
violence, namely the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) and the  
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) source. We simply cannot use ACLED since 
it records data for Indonesia only from 2016 onwards. The reason why we prefer the 
NVMS dataset over the Uppsala UCDP is that UCDP mainly relies on international 
news reporting, while NVMS in contrast also covers more than a hundred newspapers 
operating not only at the national, but also provincial and district level, making it harder 
to miss incidents, which is important given our research design is at the sub-national 
level. UCDP has no data on non-fatal violence but we can compare our data on 
fatalities per capita with UCDP. We find correlation coefficients of 0.74, 0.72 and 0.68 
with, respectively, the low, best and high estimates data reported in UCDP.2  
The NVMS dataset contains information on violence from the separatist conflict and 
from other sources. Separatist conflict refers to “violence triggered by efforts to secede 
from the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia.” We use two measures of conflict 
intensity attributed to the separatist conflict, namely fatal violence, which is the sum 
 
 
2 If we were to employ the UCDP data in our estimations, then we find similar results except the 






total over the period 1999 to 2004 of people killed (fatalities), and non-fatal violence, 
which is the sum total of people suffering injuries, kidnappings and rapes. We express 
both measures of violence in per capita terms (of 1,000 people) to make them 
comparable across districts. This is consistent with the argument of Mueller (2016) 
that in order to compare violence levels across areas that vary considerably in 
population size one should employ violence per capita measures. 
The evolution of deaths from violence and conflict in Aceh shows that before the 
tsunami struck in late 2004 and the peace deal came about in 2005, most deaths were 
due to the separatist conflict (see figure 1). Most of the casualties were civilians 
(Human Rights Watch, 2003; ICG, 2001). The separatist conflict may have spilled over 
to other forms of violence, as deaths from non-separatist related violence also 
appeared to have been surging during times of war. Separatist casualties came down 
after the Indian Ocean tsunami striking Acehnese shores on December 26th 2004 and 
essentially stopped after the peace deal was signed in August 2005. In the early 
2000s, a rough average of about 2,000 persons a year lost their lives in the separatist 
conflict, going down to 208 casualties in 2005, then to only 1 casualty in 2006, and 
finally 0 casualties in 2007.3   
 
 
3 Official statistics point to about 30,000 people killed during the violent conflict between GAM rebels 
and government soldiers from 1976 to 2005 (MSR 2009). The NVMS records start in 1999 and account 










Note: The graph depicts the sum of all deaths occurring in all districts of Aceh.  
 
Similar to deaths, non-fatal violence from separatist war also came to a complete halt 
after the peace agreement (see figure 2). Injuries include bruises, loss of 
consciousness, broken bones and any issues requiring hospital treatment. Rapes 
include men, women, and children raped or molested. Kidnappings denote number of 


































Note: The graph depicts the sum of all persons injured, raped or kidnapped in all districts of Aceh.  
 
 
Violence is not homogeneously distributed across Aceh: there were certain hotspots 
of violence, hubs of relative peace, and grades in-between (see map 2 for fatal 
violence and map 3 for non-fatal violence). The geographical distributions of both 
measures are rather similar and they are correlated at r = 0.89 with each other. No 
clear pattern of spatial clustering of violence is apparent from the maps with all sides 
of the island being affected, in the South towards the Indian Ocean and in the North 
towards the Strait of Malacca, both West and East coasts of the province. Rural 
districts tended to experience more violence than the more urban districts of Banda 
Aceh, Langsa, Lhokseumawe, Sabang and Subulussalam since it was easier for the 
rebels to organise and hide in more rural districts. For this and other reasons, one of 


































Map 2: Fatal violence per capita in Aceh from 1999 - 2004 
 







Map 3: Non-fatal violence per capita in Aceh from 1999 – 2004 
 
 
Source: NVMS dataset.  
 
 
We sourced district-level GDP data from the Indonesia Database for Policy and 
Economic Research (INDO-DAPOER), which is maintained by the World Bank.4 
DAPOER is based on data collected by the annual National Socio-Economic Survey 
 
 
4 For a more in-depth documentation of the dataset, see http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/indonesia-database-for-policy-and-economic-research (last accessed: 15 November 2020). 
non-fatal violence 






(SUSENAS). SUSENAS is fielded every year, covers a sample of about 250,000 
households and is representative at the district level. For two reasons, the oil and gas 
sector are excluded from the GDP data in our main analysis. Firstly, the economic 
activity from oil and gas production is much more volatile than economic output from 
other sectors. Secondly, according to World Bank (2009), there are concerns about 
data quality which lead to large discrepancies of data coming from the Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources and other governmental agencies (see World Bank, 
2009). However, we include the oil and gas sector in the GDP data in a robustness 
test. 
GDP data for the district of Subulussalam over the period 2003 to 2006 are evidently 
unreliable in INDO-DAPOER, likely on account of administrative changes, and are 
therefore set to missing. Our findings on the negative economic legacy effects of 
armed conflict are, however, robust to including the recorded growth rates in 
Subulussalam over this period (results not shown). 
We employ the technique of differences-in-differences regression for causal 
identification. This is an ideal technique for a case like ours in which it is contested 
whether the end of conflict can plausibly be regarded as being exogenous due to the 
2004 Boxing Day tsunami such that the treatment (the end of armed conflict) could be 
regarded as providing a quasi-natural experiment.  As Angrist and Pischke (2015: 178) 
explain: “The differences-in-differences (DD) method recognizes that in the absence 
of random assignment, treatment and control groups are likely to differ for many 
reasons. Sometimes, however, treatment and control outcomes move in parallel in the 
absence of treatment. When they do, the divergence of a post-treatment path from the 






the identifying assumption is therefore that more violent districts grew in parallel with 
less violent districts before the cessation of conflict, an assumption that can be tested 
and for which we provide supporting evidence. 
There are three main periods in our dataset, namely the conflict period 1999-2004, the 
transition year 2005, and the post-conflict period 2006-2012. However, we further 
disaggregate the post-conflict period into two sub-periods, estimating separate 
treatment effects, namely the period in which international aid of a total of USD 7.7 
billion was disbursed (2006 to 2008) and the period thereafter – aid was officially 
completed in early 2009 (Henderson & Lee, 2015; and Masyrafah & McKeon, 2008). 
We therefore estimate the following equation with district- and year-specific fixed 
effects and standard errors adjusted for panel-specific serial correlation within units 
and for contemporaneous spatial autocorrelation across units up to a distance of 
100km (Conley 1999 & 2008; Hsiang 2010):5    
ΔY𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∑ [(𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡)]
2004
𝑡=2003
+ 𝛽2 ∑ [(𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡)]
2005
𝑡=2005
+ 𝛽3 ∑ [(𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡)]
2008
𝑡=2006
+ 𝛽4 ∑ [(𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡)]
2012
𝑡=2009
+ 𝛾𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                        (1) 
Note that because our dependent variable is the economic growth rate, we lose the 
year 1999 since the first year for which we have information on economic growth (as 
opposed to GDP) is 2000. The omitted reference category in equation (1) is therefore 
 
 
5 The choice of 100 kilometres as cut-off point is somewhat arbitrary. We can set the cut-off limit much 






the period 2000 to 2002. Pi measures conflict intensity (fatal or non-fatal violence per 
capita), and Tt is equal to 1 in year t and 0 otherwise. The district fixed effects 𝛾𝑖 are 
necessary for differences-in-differences estimation, while the year-specific fixed 
effects 𝑑𝑡 capture any time-varying shocks over the period 2000 to 2012 that affect all 
districts within Aceh equally. 
In estimating equation (1), 𝛽1 , which estimates whether more violent districts grew 
statistically significantly differently from less violent districts during 2003 to 2004, 
should not be statistically significant if the parallel historic paths assumption between 
districts that were exposed to relatively high violence and districts exposed to relatively 
low violence is correct.6 Violation of this condition would throw differences-in-
differences into doubt as a causal identification strategy. The coefficient 𝛽2 estimates 
whether districts with higher conflict intensity experienced higher or lower growth in 
the transition to peace year 2005. The coefficient 𝛽3 captures the economic legacy 
effect of civil conflict during the post-conflict but aid-fuelled reconstruction period of 
2006 to 2008. With aid flows drying up in 2008, the coefficient 𝛽4 tests whether the 





6 The choice of two years for the pre-treatment period of 2003 to 2004 is somewhat arbitrary. Results 
are robust to choosing a longer period of 2002 to 2004, in which case the omitted reference category 







Before we show results from the differences-in-differences analysis, we start with 
some descriptive statistics that can provide a tentative picture of association without 
being based on a causal identification strategy. If the argument is correct that districts 
that saw relatively little violence during the conflict can function as credible 
counterfactuals in the post-conflict period for districts that saw relatively more violence 
during the conflict, then it must be true that, across districts, there is no relationship 
between the extent of violence and GDP growth during the conflict period. Figure 3 
provides a scatter plot diagram of the two variables where we use fatalities per capita 
as our measure of conflict intensity. The correlation coefficient between wartime 
violence and contemporaneous levels of GDP is practically zero at -0.01 and 






Figure 3: Wartime growth (2000-2004) versus wartime conflict casualties per 
capita (1999-2004) in Acehnese districts 
  
Note: GDP growth rate in percent refers to the average annual growth rate. The equation for the fitted 




The fact that the relatively peaceful districts grew on average by about the same rate 
as the relatively violent districts during the conflict period is likely to result from 
economic spill-overs from the relatively violent onto the relatively peaceful districts 
during the conflict. Murdoch and Sandler (2004) find such spill-over effects for 
economic growth from one country affected by civil war to another; the same can be 
expected and likely to be stronger within a country and particularly so for a region that 
is small in geographic size as Aceh is. The sheer threat of violence may be enough to 






have been lower in relatively peaceful areas as many potential investors may have 
lumped all the districts together, not discerning the geospatial nuances of investment 
risk.  
Remaining with purely descriptive statistics, figure 4 provides a scatter plot diagram of 
conflict intensity during 1999 to 2004 versus peacetime (2006 to 2012) economic 
growth rates. There is now a statistically significant negative correlation line with the 
correlation coefficient at -0.63, suggesting negative economic legacy effects: relatively 
violent districts grew more slowly than relatively peaceful districts in the post-conflict 
period. Of note, every district in Aceh grew faster during peacetime than it did during 
wartime. These descriptive statistics therefore provide evidence as follows: on the one 
hand, peace is clearly good for the Acehnese economy benefiting all districts within 
Aceh; on the other hand, there seem to be negative economic legacy effects of armed 
conflict in that districts that were relatively less affected by the conflict violence receive 
a higher peace dividend in the form of stronger economic growth than districts that 






Figure 4: Peacetime growth (2006-2012) versus wartime conflict casualties per 
capita (1999-2004) in Acehnese districts  
  
Note: GDP per capita growth rate refers to the average annual log growth rate during peacetime. Killed 
persons refer to the number of casualties during wartime. There are 23 districts in Aceh. Persons killed 
refer to victims from the separatist war. The equation for the fitted linear regression line is y = 7.39– 
0.63x, with a coefficient significant at the 5 percent level (p=0.023) and an R-squared of 0.22. The two 
overlapping and therefore illegible district labels are ‘Lhokseumawe’ and ‘Pidie Jaya’. 
 
As the last piece of illustrative evidence before moving to the formal differences-in-
differences analysis, Figure 5 displays the mean GDP growth dynamics of districts that 
experienced below median violence as measured by deaths per capita (blue line) 
versus districts above median violence (red line). The figure is consistent with the 
parallel historical paths assumption up until 2004 on which the differences-in-
differences analysis is built. Divergence starts from 2005 onwards with districts with 












Note: GDP measures are normalized to the year 2004.  
 
Descriptive statistical analysis is no substitute for causal identification, however, and 
we now move to the differences-in-differences analysis. Table 1 reports the results 
from estimating equation (1), once for fatal violence per capita and once for non-lethal 
violence per capita as our measures of conflict intensity. We find that the results are 
similar for both measures of conflict intensity. In both cases we find a statistically 
insignificant coefficient close to zero for the 2002 to 2004 period, which supports the 
identifying assumption of parallel historical paths between relatively more violent and 






growth disadvantage of more violent districts. Crucially, the growth disadvantage of 
previously relatively more violent districts continues during the 2006 to 2008 period. 
From 2009 onwards, it appears that the economic legacy effects have been overcome 
and the districts that had experienced relatively more violence no longer grow 
statistically significantly more slowly than the districts that experienced relatively less 
violence during the conflict. In substantive terms, a one standard deviation increase in 
violence during the conflict is estimated to result in a growth disadvantage of about 2.7 
percentage points in 2005 and about 1.3 percentage points per annum during the 
period 2006 to 2008 if violence is measured as fatalities per capita and, respectively, 
2.8 percentage points and 0.7 percentage points per annum for non-fatal violence per 
capita. 
Table 1: The effect of conflict intensity on district-level GDP growth  
            
Measure of conflict intensity: fatalities p.c. non-fatal violence p.c.    
Conflict intensity (2003-04) 0.00155 0.000237    
  (0.00267) (0.00112)    
Conflict intensity (2005) -0.0412** -0.0324***    
  (0.0172) (0.00780)    
Conflict intensity (2006-08) -0.0120** -0.00466**    
  (0.00602) (0.00207)    
Conflict intensity (2009-12) -0.000657 -0.000417    
  (0.00196) (0.000629)    
Observations 295 295    
R-squared 0.697 0.721    
Note: Dependent variable is annual GDP growth rate. Each column reports results from 
separate OLS regressions with district and year fixed effects included. Standard errors 
adjusted for panel-specific serial correction, heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous spatial 
correlation in parentheses. *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.  
Is it possible to attribute the economic legacy effects to destruction of physical capital 
versus destruction of human capital during the conflict? Unfortunately, the available 






physical capital and human capital destruction were closely related in the civil war, as 
figure 6 shows, which plots the number of buildings damaged or destroyed per capita 
(as a proxy for physical capital destruction) against number of fatalities per capita and 
non-fatal violence per capita (as our two proxies for human capital destruction). As 
can be seen, there is a very strong positive correlation.  
Figure 6: Human capital destruction versus physical capital destruction 
Panel A: Fatalities p.c.    Panel B: Non-fatal violence p.c. 
   
Note: Buildings damaged includes buildings destroyed. All measures refer to the cumulative count 
from 1999 – 2004.  
 
What can we say about the reasons or causal mechanisms for the economic legacy 
effects found in table 1? In Heger and Neumayer (2019) we explore the tsunami’s 
effect on structural economic change and, using synthetic control as the inferential 
technique, we show that Aceh as a whole expanded its tertiary sector much faster 
post-tsunami than a counterfactual synthetically created Aceh would have done. 
Building on this finding, the results reported in table 2 explore whether these are also 
causal mechanisms why districts more exposed to violence during the conflict grew 
more slowly during 2005 to 2008. We have no district-level data on capital formation 
but use growth in the construction sector as a (crude) proxy for capital formation. We 






sector and construction sector expansion, particularly if non-fatal violence per capita 
is our measure of conflict intensity.  
Table 2: The effect of conflict intensity on district-level growth in tertiary sector and  
construction sector 
        
Dependent variable:  Tertiary sector growth Construction sector growth 
     
Measure of conflict intensity: 
 








   
Conflict intensity (2003-04) 0.0123 0.00540 0.00400 0.000962 
  (0.0128) (0.00544) (0.00537) (0.00238) 
Conflict intensity (2005) -0.0280* -0.0225** -0.0267 -0.0257** 
  (0.0165) (0.00894) (0.0206) (0.0108) 
Conflict intensity (2006-08) -0.0247 -0.0110* -0.00262 -0.00249 
  (0.0158) (0.00602) (0.00665) (0.00336) 
Conflict intensity (2009-12) 0.000492 0.000312 -0.00354 -0.00223* 
  (0.00259) (0.00106) (0.00315) (0.00127) 
Observations 295 295 295 295 
R-squared 0.586 0.582 0.380 0.392 
Note: Dependent variable is annual tertiary sector growth rate and construction sector growth 
rate, respectively. Each column reports results from separate OLS regressions with year and 
district fixed effects included. Standard errors adjusted for panel-specific serial correction, 
heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous spatial correlation in parentheses. *, **, *** 
statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.  
 
6. Robustness tests and potential threats to inferential validity 
In this section, we submit our findings to robustness tests and we discuss the potential 
confounding effects of the impact of the tsunami, of the distribution of aid and the 
displacement of people as potential threats to inferential validity. Firstly, one may 
wonder whether our decision to group years into certain, albeit well-defined, periods 
hides significant variation within these periods. Results reported in table 3 therefore 






results suggest that statistically significant economic growth disadvantages occur 
during the years 2005 to 2007, but not from 2008 onwards.  
Table 3: Robustness test: Yearly effect estimates 
            
Measure of conflict intensity: fatalities p.c. non-fatal violence p.c.    
Conflict intensity (2001) -0.00124 -0.000740    
  (0.00249) (0.000668)    
Conflict intensity (2002) -0.00196 -0.000689    
  (0.00285) (0.000785)    
Conflict intensity (2003) 0.00210 0.000181    
  (0.00459) (0.00224)    
Conflict intensity (2004) -0.00122 -0.000685    
  (0.00266) (0.000728)    
Conflict intensity (2005) -0.0423** -0.0329***    
  (0.0173) (0.00785)    
Conflict intensity (2006) -0.0329** -0.0129**    
  (0.0139) (0.00621)    
Conflict intensity (2007) -0.00256 -0.00130*    
  (0.00280) (0.000684)    
Conflict intensity (2008) -0.00405 -0.00133    
  (0.00389) (0.00180)    
Conflict intensity (2009) -0.00218 -0.00102    
  (0.00343) (0.00113)    
Conflict intensity (2010) -0.00167 -0.000797    
  (0.00310) (0.000984)    
Conflict intensity (2011) -0.00118 -0.000666    
  (0.00264) (0.000856)    
Conflict intensity (2012) -0.00185 -0.00109    
  (0.00260) (0.000823)    
Observations 295 295    
R-squared 0.717 0.729    
Note: Dependent variable is annual GDP growth rate. Each column reports results from 
separate OLS regressions with district and year fixed effects included. Standard errors 
adjusted for panel-specific serial correction, heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous spatial 
correlation in parentheses. *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.  
Secondly, it is not entirely clear whether the GDP growth rate or the growth rate in 
GDP per capita should be the main outcome of interest. We agree with Hodler (2019) 
who argues in favour of GDP on the basis that, firstly, GDP per capita measures can 






population data are typically heavily smoothed over time. Clearly, views differ on which 
of the two should be the main outcome of interest but in any case results reported in 
table 4 show that we arrive at qualitatively the same result if we employ growth in GDP 
per capita rather than growth in GDP as the dependent variable.  
Table 4: Robustness test: district-level GDP per capita growth  
      
Measure of conflict intensity: fatalities p.c. non-fatal violence p.c. 
Conflict intensity (2003-04) -0.000475 -0.00177 
  (0.00266) (0.00148) 
Conflict intensity (2005) -0.0208*** -0.0155*** 
  (0.00617) (0.00361) 
Conflict intensity (2006-08) -0.0161*** -0.00831*** 
  (0.00586) (0.00179) 
Conflict intensity (2009-12) -0.00154 -0.00114 
  (0.00361) (0.00236) 
Observations 295 295 
R-squared 0.572 0.569 
Note: Dependent variable is annual GDP per capita growth rate. Each column reports results 
from separate OLS regressions with district and year fixed effects included. Standard errors 
adjusted for panel-specific serial correction, heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous spatial 
correlation in parentheses. *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.  
In the next robustness test, for which results are reported in table 5 we include the oil 
and gas sector in the GDP measures on which growth rates are based. Results are 
robust except for the growth disadvantage in 2005, with the coefficient of this variable 






Table 5: Robustness test: including oil and gas revenues in GDP measures  
      
Measure of conflict intensity: fatalities p.c. non-fatal violence p.c. 
Conflict intensity (2003-04) -0.00851 -0.00564 
  (0.0152) (0.00992) 
Conflict intensity (2005) -0.0349 -0.0237 
  (0.0261) (0.0231) 
Conflict intensity (2006-08) -0.0262* -0.0153* 
  (0.0141) (0.00792) 
Conflict intensity (2009-12) -0.00721 -0.00446 
  (0.00907) (0.00556) 
Observations 295 295 
R-squared 0.269 0.268 
Note: Dependent variable is annual GDP per capita growth rate. Each column reports results 
from separate OLS regressions with district and year fixed effects included. Standard errors 
adjusted for panel-specific serial correction, heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous spatial 
correlation in parentheses. *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.  
The conflict hotspots were rural areas, rather than cities. GAM rebels located 
preferentially in rural districts as it was easier to hide in the rural jungle than in the 
cities, among other tactical reasons. Part of the reason for why the more conflict-
affected districts grew more slowly could therefore have something to do with the fact 
that their counterfactuals contain city districts that have a different growth potential 
than rural districts (Kabupatens). The identifying assumption of our differences-in-
differences design is that more violent districts grew in parallel with less violent districts 
during the conflict period. We have presented supportive evidence for this identifying 
assumption but critics might argue that this is sheer coincidence. In a robustness test 
for assessing whether the negative economic legacy effects still hold if we exclude city 
districts that may have a structurally different growth trajectory and potential, we 
exclude the five city districts (Kotas) of Banda Aceh, Langsa, Lhokseumawe, Sabang 
and Subulussalam and repeat the differences-in-differences analysis without them – 






Table 6: Robustness test: rural districts only 
      
Measure of conflict intensity: fatalities p.c. non-fatal violence p.c. 
Conflict intensity (2003-04) 0.00208 0.000342 
  (0.00315) (0.00127) 
Conflict intensity (2005) -0.0449** -0.0331*** 
  (0.0194) (0.00737) 
Conflict intensity (2006-08) -0.00883 -0.00386* 
  (0.00623) (0.00208) 
Conflict intensity (2009-12) -0.000605 -0.000325 
  (0.00184) (0.000494) 
Observations 234 234 
R-squared 0.690 0.728 
Note: Dependent variable is annual GDP per capita growth rate. Each column reports results 
from separate OLS regressions with district and year fixed effects included. Standard errors 
adjusted for panel-specific serial correction, heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous spatial 
correlation in parentheses. *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.  
The negative economic legacy effects are almost identical for 2005 but become slightly 
weaker in the 2006-08 period if the city districts are excluded from the analysis and 
statistically insignificant if we use fatalities per capita as the measure of conflict 
intensity.  
In table 7 we explore whether the conflict experience in neighbouring or adjacent 
districts has spillover effects onto the post-conflict growth performance. In formal 
terms, this requires the inclusion of a spatial-x variable, where the spatial-x variable 
measures how exposed adjacent (contiguous) districts have been on average during 
the armed conflict. We include such a variable the robustness test reported in table 7. 
We do not find statistically significant effects for the spatial-x variables (coefficients not 







Table 7: Robustness test: controlling for conflict intensity in adjacent districts 
 
            
Measure of conflict intensity: fatalities p.c. non-fatal violence p.c.    
Conflict intensity (2003-04) 0.00137 0.000135    
  (0.00264) (0.000944)    
Conflict intensity (2005) -0.0412** -0.0324***    
  (0.0172) (0.00771)    
Conflict intensity (2006-08) -0.0118** -0.00443**    
  (0.00578) (0.00182)    
Conflict intensity (2009-12) -0.000648 -0.000405    
  (0.00199) (0.000635)    
Observations 295 295    
R-squared 0.697 0.724    
Note: Dependent variable is annual GDP growth rate. Each column reports results from 
separate OLS regressions with district and year fixed effects included. Spatial-x variables 
measuring average conflict intensity in adjacent districts included (coefficients not shown). 
Standard errors adjusted for panel-specific serial correction, heteroscedasticity and 
contemporaneous spatial correlation in parentheses. *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 
5 and 1 percent level.  
Turning to potential threats to inferential validity, the effect from the tsunami and 
reconstruction efforts in its wake, which differentially affected districts in Aceh, may 
potentially confound the economic legacy effects of civil war. In Heger and Neumayer 
(2019), we demonstrate that flooded districts grew faster from 2006 to 2008, that is, 
after the natural disaster, than non-flooded districts. Map 3 shows where the tsunami 






Map 3: Inundation areas of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in the Aceh province 
 
Note: Flooded areas according to the German Aerospace maps & the Dartmouth Flood Observatory 
estimations. The Aceh province has 23 districts, of which 10 were flooded and 13 were not. The above 
map does not show the two island districts of Simeulue and Aceh Singkil that were also flooded.    
 
In a further robustness test we formally control for the impact of the tsunami to make 
sure that the destructive effects followed by massive aid-fuelled reconstruction efforts 
do not conflate our findings on the economic legacy of armed conflict. To do so, we 
add time-invariant tsunami treatment variables Di to the estimation equation, with Di 
measuring how many people are estimated to have been killed by the tsunami as a 






also control for the total sum of aid per capita disbursed from 2005 onwards to districts, 
where Ai measures aid disbursements per capita. The estimation equation therefore 
becomes: 
ΔY𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∑ [(𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡)]
2004
𝑡=2003
+ 𝛽2 ∑ [(𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡)]
2005
𝑡=2005
+ 𝛽3 ∑ [(𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡)]
2008
𝑡=2006
+ 𝛽4 ∑ [(𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡)]
2012
𝑡=2009
+ 𝜆1 ∑ [(𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡)]
2004
𝑡=2003




+𝜆3 ∑ [(𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡)]
2008
𝑡=2006
+ 𝜆4 ∑ [(𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡)]
2012
𝑡=2009
   + 𝜇1 ∑ [(𝐴𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡)]
2004
𝑡=2003
    
+𝜇2 ∑ [(𝐴𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡)]
2005
𝑡=2005
+ 𝜇3 ∑ [(𝐴𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡)]
2008
𝑡=2006
+ 𝜇4 ∑ [(𝐴𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡)]
2012
𝑡=2009
+𝑑𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
 
Results reported in table 8 demonstrate that our results are hardly affected by 
including these two potential confounders. The results are practically identical to the 
ones reported in table 1. In non-reported further tests, we interacted the conflict with 
the tsunami variables. We find a statistically significant negative interaction effect in 
2005 only. This suggests that some of the growth disadvantage in 2005 of districts 
that experienced greater conflict intensity might be down to them having experienced 
greater economic damage by the tsunami in that year than less violent districts have. 
However, the economic growth disadvantage of more violent districts is not impacted 
by their tsunami experience over the period 2006 to 2008. Similarly, we interacted the 
conflict with the aid disbursements variables, following a finding by De Juan et al. 






development in the wake of an earthquake in Nepal, but found no evidence for 
statistically significant interaction effects. 
Table 8: Robustness test: controlling for tsunami deaths per capita and aid 
disbursements per capita 
      
Measure of conflict intensity: fatalities p.c. non-fatal violence p.c. 
Conflict intensity (2003-04) -0.000162 -0.00202 
  (0.00323) (0.00228) 
Conflict intensity (2005) -0.0197*** -0.0154*** 
  (0.00529) (0.00454) 
Conflict intensity (2006-08) -0.0181** -0.0135** 
  (0.00749) (0.00538) 
Conflict intensity (2009-12) -0.000864 -0.000858 
  (0.00228) (0.00196) 
Observations 295 295 
R-squared 0.768 0.765 
Note: Dependent variable is annual GDP growth rate. Each column reports results from 
separate OLS regressions with district and year fixed effect included. Estimations include the 
tsunami deaths per capita and aid disbursement per capita variables from equation (2) as 
control variables (coefficients not shown). Standard errors adjusted for panel-specific serial 
correction, heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous spatial correlation in parentheses. *, **, 
*** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.  
 
Another potential threat to inferential validity stems from internal population 
displacement during the civil war. Movements of people out of the units of analysis, 
the districts within Aceh, may violate the stable unit treatment value assumption 
(SUTVA). There are two types of displacement that may pose a challenge. Firstly, 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) may move from one district to another district 
within Aceh; secondly, IDPs may move out of Aceh altogether and flee to another 
Indonesian province, such as North Sumatra.  
It is estimated that the conflict led to between 500,000 and 600,000 IDPs from 1999 
to 2004 (IDMC 2006, 2010). There were two main waves of displacement (Czaika & 






temporarily fled from the violence in their village, escaping to, inter alia, community 
centres and mosques within the province, mostly even within the districts, and they 
returned within one or two weeks to their villages. This first wave therefore does not 
violate the SUTVA. 
The second wave of displacement, when the fighting intensified from 2001 onwards, 
is potentially more problematic. The increasing violence resulted in a swell in numbers 
of IDPs, reaching almost 180,000 by September 2002, and eventually amounting to 
more than half a million. Many of these displaced people had to stay away from their 
villages for months and in some cases for as long as two years. The great majority of 
them returned before the end of the civil war (Ramly 2005), but about one quarter of 
IDPs have stayed at the destination where they fled to, particularly if they fled to 
another province outside Aceh. According to one estimate as many as almost 150,000 
IDPs who fled to neighbouring provinces during the separatist conflict are still outside 
of Aceh by 2010 (IDMC 2010).  The majority of these IDPs who have still not returned 
are ethic Javanese (Hedman 2005).  They fled, occasionally even with military escort, 
predominantly to Medan in Northern Sumatra (Buiza and Risser 2003). The ethnic 
Acehnese who moved outside of the province were met oftentimes with considerable 
amounts of hostility, risk of arrest, detention and therefore many returned to Aceh 
before the end of the civil war. However, the non-return of the ethnic Javanese people 
to districts within Aceh that saw intense violent conflict during the war likely leads to 
an overestimation of the negative economic legacy effects if estimated in growth in 
GDP since fewer economically productive people are present after the civil war than 






growth in GDP per capita suggests that the legacy effects cannot simply be due to 
population loss.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In this study, we have exploited the relatively high quality data on sub-national  
violence and economic growth in Aceh to analyse the economic legacy effects from 
civil war. Our analysis over the period 2000 to 2012 showed that, for each and every 
district in the sample, average economic growth rates were higher after the end of 
conflict in 2005 than during the war years, which indicates a general peace dividend 
in the form of catch-up growth, consistent with macro-economic theory and with much 
of the existing empirical evidence at the national or cross-national level.  
Importantly, however, at the same time we find specific negative economic legacy 
effects of armed conflict since the districts exposed relatively more to violent conflict 
during the war experience statistically significantly lower economic growth during the 
years 2005 to 2008 than their counterfactual counterparts, namely districts that were 
exposed relatively less to violence during the conflict. By contrast, relatively more 
violent and relatively more peaceful districts grew at similar rates that are not 
statistically distinguishable during the conflict period. This suggests that even though 
relatively peaceful districts were less directly affected by violence during the war, they 
were indirectly held back economically by a state of perpetual civil war throughout the 
province of Aceh. Once the conflict is over, however, the heterogeneous exposure to 
conflict intensity results in a negative economic legacy effect for the hot spots of 






being exposed to more intense violence during the conflict in Aceh proved 
economically damaging after the end of rather than during the civil war for these hot 
spots of violence. Preliminary evidence that deserves a much more detailed 
exploration in future research suggests that more peaceful districts managed to 
expand their tertiary sector faster and increase their per capita capital formation by 
more than more violent districts managed to. 
This finding of relative negative economic legacy effects corroborates similar findings 
by Collier and Duponchel (2012) for Sierra Leone and Serneels and Verpoorten (2015) 
for Rwanda. Since social science should, at its best, provide cumulative knowledge, 
this is encouraging as it provides evidence on the external validity of these findings. 
Due to their research design, which is limited by the availability of data over time, 
neither of these two studies can estimate when the negative legacy effects disappear. 
In our own study, the negative effects are relatively short-lived: at the latest from 2009 
onwards, i.e. 4 years after the full cessation of conflict, we no longer find a statistically 
significant growth disadvantage of districts that were more heavily exposed to violence 
during the conflict. Future research, which like our analysis must employ sub-national 
economic and violence data, can provide further insight into the external validity of our 
central finding of negative economic legacy effects in the aftermath of armed conflict 
that, in the case of Aceh at least, last for about 4 years. 
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